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Exclusionary Manipulation of Carbon Permit Markets: A Laboratory Test
Björn Carlén†
Abstract
The experiment reported here tests the case of so-called exclusionary manipulation of emission
permit markets, i.e., when a dominant firm—here a monopolist—increases its holding of permits in
order to raise its rivals’ costs and thereby gain more on a product market. Earlier studies have
claimed that this type of market manipulation is likely to substantially reduce the social gains of
permit trading and even result in negative gains. The experiment designed here parallels
institutional and informational conditions likely to hold in real trade with carbon permits among
electricity producers. Although the dominant firm withheld supply from the electricity market, the
outcome seems to reject the theory of exclusionary manipulation. In later trading periods, closing
prices on both markets, permit holdings and total electricity production are near competitive levels.
Social gains of emissions trading are higher than in earlier studies.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Several European countries have decided to use tradable permits to control their greenhouse-
gas emissions or consider doing so. At least for an initial period, a number of countries appear to
opt for industry-specific applications of tradable permit (TP) systems instead of systems covering
all emitters. For instance, Denmark has established a TP system for carbon emissions—the single
most important greenhouse gas—that only covers emissions from (large) electricity producers
(Danish Parliament, 1999). Moreover, the Commission of the European Union has proposed a
TP system for greenhouse gases that only would comprise a few industries (EU, 2001).1
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1
 Since greenhouse gases are fully mixed emissions (i.e., the effect on the climate is given by the aggregate
emissions level only (IPCC, 1996), there exist no environmental reasons to control the geographical distribution
of these emissions.
2Restricting the coverage of carbon TP systems in this way may be costly, not only because
emitters will face different carbon prices depending on whether or not they are embraced by the
emission cap—as discussed in e.g., Babiker et al. (2000)—but also since limiting the number of
traders may generate market power outcomes.
Most, if not all assessments of market power effects in emissions trading presume that the
large seller (buyer)—or a group of sellers (buyers)—would exert market power by reducing the
quantity it supplies (purchases), a behavior that inevitably would have a detrimental effect on the
cost-reducing services of emissions trading. For example, see Westskog (1996), Burniaix (1999)
and the studies reviewed in Tietenberg (1985). Hahn (1984) shows that such a quantity
withholding is optimal for the dominant trader when permit trade is governed by an institution
requiring all trade to be conducted simultaneously at a uniform price. However, such a market
institution must not govern emissions trading.
Experimental economists have for long constructed so-called laboratory markets to investigate
how various (existing) market institutions differ with respect to trade outcomes, see e.g., Smith
(1981). What seems to be a robust result is that, in particular, the so-called double auction (DA)
institution2 is able to attain high market efficiency also when the market is dominated by only a
few firms and even when it is monopolized; see Plott (1989) and Holt (1995) for reviews of this
literature. Recent emissions trading experiments based on the DA institution, i.e., Carlén (2000)
and Muller et al. (2001), confirm that the DA institution indeed is able to produce efficient trade
allocations also when a single trader dominates the market. These results stand in sharp contrast
to the standard theory of market power in emissions trading and suggest that the presence of
dominant traders need not be detrimental to the cost-effectiveness of emissions trading, at least
not as long as trade is governed by DA rules and inter-dependencies between markets are
negligible. However, since production costs of some industries (e.g., the power industry) to a
large extent would depend on the permit price, the latter condition may not be at hand.
A dominant firm may exploit this type of market inter-dependencies; see e.g., Williamson
(1968) and Salop and Scheffman (1987). Misiolek and Elder (1989) analyze how a dominant
firm by increasing its holdings of permits can raise its rivals’ production costs and thereby gain
more on the product market—see also von der Fehr (1993). Such so-called exclusionary
manipulation may further distort the permit market and add potentially large distortions on the
product market, as compared to the standard monopoly case. These additional distortions may
outweigh aggregate cost-savings attained on the permit market. If so, allowing firms to trade
emission permits would reduce overall efficiency.3
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 In traditional (single) auctions buyers bid for an object or sellers offer an object to a buyer. In DAs these
phenomena occur at the same time; sellers make offers and buyers make bids. The lowest outstanding offer and
the highest outstanding bid is the market offer/bid. Sellers and buyers may make new offers/bids whenever they
want. A transaction is struck whenever a seller’s (buyer’s) offer (bid) equals the market bid (offer). Trade under
DA rules is sequential and different transactions can be conducted at different prices. Obviously, quantity
withholding need not be optimal under DA rules. For instance, if buyers are sufficiently myopic, the dominant
trader may be able to reap higher profit by conducting price discrimination in ways that give allocations near the
efficient one. Versions of the DA institution govern trade on numerous exchanges throughout the world, such as
the New York Stock Exchange and the major Chicago commodity exchanges. Despite its importance, no general
theory regarding behavior on the DA institution has yet emerged.
3
 The conditions under which exclusionary manipulation may arise are rather restrictive, but may be at hand for a
carbon TP system covering only a single “carbon intense” industry, such as electricity production. Electricity is a
product for which (i) trade between several European countries is restricted due to limited transmission capacity,
3The case of exclusionary manipulation has been tested experimentally by Brown-Kruse,
Elliott and Godby (1995), henceforth Brown-Kruse et al., and Godby (forthcoming). In these
tests, emission permits were traded under DA rules and the final product on a market requiring
all transactions to be conducted simultaneously at a uniform price.4 Taken at face value, the
outcomes in these experiments seem to “support” the theory of exclusionary manipulation. This
has led some analysts to express skepticism about the ability of the DA-institution to limit the
exercise of market power on emission permit markets and to conclude, “Although the theory
underlying exclusionary manipulation only suggests that welfare losses are possible, the
behavioral results of the few laboratory studies that have been completed show dramatically that
the threat is real.” [italics added] (Godby et al., 1999).
It is here argued that this conclusion may be premature. One reason being that the studies
underlying this claim treat emission permits as if being a physical input in production.
Consequently, in these experiments firms had to acquire permits before they could produce. In
addition, firms had to decide upon their final permit holdings prior to engaging in transactions on
the product market, i.e., before knowing the product price and, hence, their valuations of permits.
As explained below (Section 3), on existing emission (and proposed carbon) permit markets
firms may produce/emit and sell their output before they have to possess any permits.
The experiment presented here tests the case of exclusionary manipulation under conditions
that more closely than earlier experiments parallel a trading situation likely for carbon markets.
More precisely, the design includes (some) potentially important institutional and informational
conditions likely to hold for real carbon permits trade amongst electricity producers, the perhaps
most significant application of industry-specific carbon TP systems. In this context, both the
permit market and the product market may be governed by DA rules. A few laboratory
experiments have been carried out regarding trade on inter-related DA markets, often with high
trade efficiency as the primary result; see Holt (1995) for a review of this literature. However, to
the best of the author’s knowledge, no experiment has been reported that tests the case of market
power in inter-related DA markets, which is what the experiment reported here amounts to.
The experiment uses the aggregate costs and value schedules that were used in Brown-Kruse
et al. and Godby (forthcoming). But, in contrast to these tests it focuses only on the case where
the dominant firm holds a monopoly position on the permit market, the potentially worst case
under exclusionary manipulation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly accounts for the two standard theories of
market power on emission permit markets. In Section 3, the likely trading situation for electricity
producers is outlined. The design of the experiment is described in Section 4. The experimental
outcome is presented in Section 5. Some concluding remarks are given in a final section.
                                                                                                                                                              
(ii) the concentration on domestic markets often is high, and (iii) the cost of substituting away from fossil fuels
in the production may be high. Of course, exclusionary manipulation would not be an issue if firms could trade
carbon permits internationally, as “suggested” by the Kyoto protocol, UN (1997). However, governments may
choose to restrict firms’ access to an international carbon market. In addition, several countries plan to
implement TP systems prior to the first commitment period of the Kyoto protocol (should it enter into force),
i.e., before international trade with carbon emissions under an international climate treaty is likely to occur.
4
 A complete description of procedures and results of these experiments can be found in Godby (1997) Chapter 4
and Chapter 5, respectively. Moreover, the experiments are summarized in Godby et al. (1999), Godby (2000)
and Brown-Kruse et al. (forthcoming).
42. TWO TYPES OF PERMIT MARKET MANIPULATION—THE MONOPOLY CASE
This section illustrates the principal effects of a firm that holds a monopoly position on the
permit market and uses its market power (a) to maximize its profits from permits trade alone as
compared to (b) maximizing its overall profits (profits from permit trade plus profits from
transactions on a product market). The illustrations are based on theoretical contributions made by
Hahn (1984) and Misiolek and Elder (1989). In line with these studies it is assumed throughout
this section that trade in permits is (i) governed by an institution that requires all transactions to be
conducted simultaneously at a uniform price, and (ii) only occurs at the beginning of the period
over which emissions are regulated. Often these assumptions are made since they facilitate the
analytical work and allow clear analytical predictions and not for the reason that such an
institutional arrangement would be a good candidate for real emissions trading.
Consider the case where the government has put a cap on an industry’s aggregate emission
level and distributed tradable emission permits gratis to the firms therein in such a way that a
single firm (firm D) holds a monopoly position on the permit market. All other firms are
assumed to behave as price takers and are, for simplicity, treated as a competitive fringe (firm F).
Such a permit market is illustrated in Figure 1, where:
(i) firm D’s (F’s) emissions are counted from the right (left) axis to the left (right) and the
width of the open box represents the allowed aggregate emission level,
(ii) eD (eF) is firm D’s (F’s) emission level in the absence of any policy controlling emissions
(for simplicity it is assumed that eD = eF),
(iii) MACD (MACF) shows firm D’s (F’s) marginal abatement costs,
(iv) Q denotes the initial permit allocation, and
(v) q denotes the firms’ emission levels ex post permit trade.
If all firms act as profit-maximizing price takers, each firm would emit and sell/buy permits
until its MAC equals the competitive price level, P*. Thus, competitive permit trade would
equalize MAC across all firms at P*. Firm D would sell Q – q* permits and firm F buy q* – Q
permits. Aggregate cost-savings from such competitive (efficient) permit trade equals the area
abc.
However, when firm D is aware of the fact that it can influence the permit price level, it
maximizes its profits on the permit market (minimizes its net-abatement costs) by selling Q – qM
permits, the quantity at which firm D’s marginal revenue (MR) and MAC are equal. Thus,
compared to the competitive outcome, firm D withholds qM – q* permits from the market. The
resulting price equals PM. Obviously aggregate cost-savings attained under this cost-minimizing
manipulation case, adec, are smaller than the ones obtained under efficient trade. As shown by
Hahn (1984) the government can, in principle, prevent this type of cost-minimizing manipulation
by adjusting the initial allocation of permits. If the initial permit allocation were q* (i.e., the
vertical line would be at q*), firm D would no longer have incentives to trade permits or
withhold permits from the market. However, to accomplish this the government must have rather
detailed information about firm D’s MAC and the MACs of the competitive fringe.
5Figure 1. Illustration of a Permit Market
Consider now the case where firm D and firm F are the only competitors also on a product
market and where also this market is governed by an institution requiring all trade to be
conducted simultaneously at a uniform price level. Given this, firm D may find it profitable to
increase its holdings of permits beyond qM, although this implies lower profits from permit trade.
The reason is that by doing so firm D increases the permit price and thereby firm F’s costs,
which could allow it to reap higher profits on the product market. Firm D finds it profitable to
increase its permit holding as long as the resulting increment in the product price exceeds the
increment in its average costs.5 Although not needed for such behavior to be profitable, the
outcome may be that all, or part, of some fringe firms’ production capacity are excluded from the
market. Therefore, this type of behavior by the dominant firm has been labeled exclusionary
manipulation of permit markets.
Let E denote firm D’s “exclusionary value” of additional permit holdings, assumed to be
independent of firm D’s current permit holdings. Given this, firm D’s value of additional permit
holdings equals MACD plus E, and it maximizes its overall profits by selling Q – qEM permits (the
quantity at which the sum MACD plus E equals MR). That is, firm D now withholds qEM – q*
permits from the market, which yields a permit price equal to PEM. Obviously, aggregate
abatement-cost savings of emissions trading under exclusionary manipulation by a firm that
holds a monopolist position on the permit market, afgc, are smaller than the savings attained
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 Misiolek and Elder (1989) state that the rise in the product price is larger (i) the easier firm D can influence the
permit price through its net purchase of permits, (ii) the more sensitive firm F’s output is to changes in the permit
price, (iii) the less elastic is the market demand for the final product, and (iv) the less elastic is firm F’s supply
with respect to the product price.
6under cost-minimizing manipulation.6 Moreover, the behavior of firm D prevents otherwise
“low-cost” units from being supplied on the product market and/or implies a higher product
price, i.e., it may induce a potentially large additional distortion on the product market.7 Whether
this additional distortion outweighs the abatement-cost savings attained—whereby allowing
firms to trade permits would reduce overall efficiency—depends crucially on the initial
allocation of permits. The closer the initial allocation is to the cost-effective one, the smaller are
the potential abatement-cost savings of permit trading and the more likely is it that exclusionary
manipulation renders permit trading to reduce overall efficiency.
In contrast to the case of cost-minimizing manipulation, the government cannot eliminate the
incentives for firm D to conduct exclusionary manipulation solely by the means of the initial
allocation of permits.
3. THE TRADING SITUATION IN CARBON PERMIT SYSTEMS
A TP system requires a number of institutional arrangements that seldom are dealt with
explicitly in theoretical work. The discussion below focuses only on a sub-set of these; (i) the
length of the compliance period (i.e., the period over which an emission objective is defined for a
given set of firms), (ii) the point in time when firms have to show compliance (i.e., when each
firm has to surrender permits to the regulator in an amount that covers its actual emissions during
the compliance period8), (iii) the consequences for firms that turn out not to be in compliance,
and (iv) the trading rules. Other institutional arrangements, such as monitoring of emissions and
enforcement of law-abiding behavior are presumed to be viable.
The length of the compliance period in a domestic carbon TP system is not likely to exceed
the length of each compliance period of the international climate treaty already in place or
expected to enter into force (e.g., five years as in the Kyoto Protocol). In contrast, governments
seem to opt for much shorter compliance periods in their domestic TP systems. For instance, in
the Danish carbon permit system and in the proposals for carbon TP systems in Norway, Sweden
and the UK, the length is one year; see e.g., NOU (2000), SOU (2000) and UK Department of
Environment (2000).
Firms can only be expected to be in compliance as long as this is less costly than the alternative.
There are several ways in which the regulator can make the cost of non-compliance high. For
instance, it may levy a penalty fee on firms that end up being in non-compliance or reduce the
number of permits non-complying firms have at their disposal in a sub-sequent compliance period,
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 Since incentives for exclusionary manipulation work to increase the dominant firm’s permit holding, they may, if
not too strong, actually increase abatement-cost savings attained on a monopsonized permit market.
7
 Additional distortions are likely to arise also on other markets. For instance, an increased product price will raise
the consumer-price level in the economy, which would lead to additional distortions on “pre-distorted” input
markets where the supply depends positively on the real net reward, Browning (1994). In the literature on the so-
called double dividend of environmental taxes this phenomena has been labeled the tax-interaction effect.
8
 In real TP systems, firms may be allowed to bank and possibly borrow (up to some limit) permits to/from the next
commitment period. Then, a firm is not allowed to emit more than its permit holdings plus borrowing minus
banking. Moreover, firms may have an opportunity to trade on futures markets, i.e., trade permits valid for the
next commitment period. None of these aspects are dealt with here.
7or a combination thereof. Here, we focus on the case where there only is a penalty fee. Obviously,
such a penalty fee implies that firms would not buy permits at prices over the level of fee.
In the literature of exclusionary manipulation, of which this study is a continuation, it has been
assumed that firms only trade permits at the beginning of the compliance period. For instance, in
Brown-Kruse et al. and Godby (forthcoming) the institutional landscape is such that firms first
could trade emission permits on a DA market and then, after the closure of the permit market, they
had to report to a “clearing-house” the number of units they wanted to produce and supply to the
market. All units produced were sold simultaneously at the market-clearing price. The assumption
of sequential markets may reflect the timing of input decisions and production decisions, but need
not be valid for permit markets. In existing emission permit markets (e.g., the Danish carbon
permit system and the SO2 allowance market in the US) as well as in many proposed carbon
permit systems, each firm is obliged to surrender permits to the regulator at the end of the
compliance period in an amount that at least covers the emissions it has generated during this
period (the calendar-year). This implies i.a. that firms can produce (emit) and enter the product
market and await better information about their valuations of permits before they have to decide
upon their final permit holdings. Moreover, firms may be allowed to trade permits also during a
so-called grace period, as on the SO2 allowance market in the US (EPA, 2002). That is, firms only
have to show compliance at some point in time after the compliance period. Hence, firms may
trade emission permits before, during and after engaging in transactions on the product market.
Trade with permits is here taken to be governed by DA rules. This is by no means an awkward
assumption. The DA institution is the prime candidate for developed tradable carbon permits
systems; see e.g., Sandor et al. (1994) and Bohm (1999). Moreover, wholesale trade with
electricity in several countries is organized as DA markets, e.g., the Scandinavian countries,
Nordpool (2002). Thus, at least in the context of carbon TP system covering only electricity
producers both the permit market and the product market may be governed by DA rules.
Given the high stakes in carbon permit trading amongst electricity producers, firms would have
strong incentives to gather information about marginal production and abatement costs of their
rivals before engaging in such trade. Since (a) the performance of different power-production
technologies is well and commonly known, (b) power producers are competing (as buyers) on the
same fuel markets, and (c) firms may acquire information by recruiting personnel from their rivals,
such gathering is likely to be rather successful. In effect, electricity producers can be expected to
have quite accurate information about each other’s marginal production and abatement costs.
To summarize, the discussion above regarding carbon permits trading among electricity
producers suggests:
(a) a compliance period of the length of one year,
(b) that firms may trade carbon permits not only during this compliance period but also
during a so-called grace period of substantially length, say, three months,
(c) that firms may end up in non-compliance, in which case they have to pay a penalty fee,
(d) that both the permit market and the electricity market are governed by DA rules, and
(e) that information asymmetries regarding firms’ costs are rather small.
An experimental design that parallels these institutional and informational conditions is outlined
in the next section.
84. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
4.1 Experimental Procedures and Environment
The design of the experiment presented here draws heavily on the ones developed in Brown-
Kruse et al. and Godby (forthcoming).9 In particular, it uses the parameter set up and market
structure that was used in the monopoly sessions in the Godby study. However, several
potentially important design changes have been made to create laboratory markets that parallel
the institutional and information conditions outlined above. Still other changes have been made
to arrive at a design that better corresponds to, at least, the present author’s beliefs—or
prejudices—about what constitutes a functional experimental design.
One change of the latter category concerns the use of an explicit context. The standard
procedure in experimental economics has been to create laboratory markets free of an explicit
context. The ambition behind this seems to have been to avoid having subjects’ behavior
influenced (in ways that add noise to or bias the outcome) by knowledge about the context.
However, as pointed out by i.a. Lowenstein (1999), also the absence of an explicit context may
affect subjects’ behavior. For instance, subjects may have difficulties grasping and solving
abstract decision problems. Moreover, subjects may create their own contexts that may or may
not be “productive.” See also Hertwig and Ortmann (2001) and the responses to their ”target”
article, and Bohm (forthcoming) for discussions on this topic. In order to avoid a situation where
subjects would not be able to perform their tasks properly because they lack experience of
dealing with abstract decision problems, subjects were here given an explicit context, namely the
one that has spurred the research question. Moreover, subjects were here exposed to pecuniary
incentives stronger than those commonly used in laboratory market experiments, which implies a
higher costs for a subject to let other considerations than the objective of maximizing his/her
firm’s profits influencing his/her decisions.
The laboratory markets comprise six electricity producers and four retailers of electricity.10
All subjects act as traders on the permit market. On the (spot) market for electricity, subjects
representing producers (retailers) act only as sellers (buyers). One producer (firm D) dominates
the electricity market in that it can produce up to 10 electricity units while each one of the five
fringe-producers has a production capacity of two units. In the absence of “abatement” activities
(fuel switching) the production of one unit of electricity (GWh) generates one unit of CO2
emissions (kton). The aggregate emission cap equals ten emission units. All permits are initially
allotted gratis to firm D. Given the induced production costs, abatement costs and the demand
for electricity, the permit allocation is such that firm D has incentives to conduct exclusionary
                                                 
9
 Brown-Kruse et al. and Godby (forthcoming) use almost identical designs. The main differences are that in the
former (latter) the number of fringe firms were 10 (five) and suppliers/demanders of permits could only sell/buy
permits (act as traders). The two studies use the same aggregate production capacity, costs and demand schedules.
10
 In Brown-Kruse et al. and Godby (forthcoming) the demand for the final product was simulated. However, since
here also the final product (electricity) is traded on a DA market, subjects with induced values of electricity—
representing retailers of electricity—constitute the market demand for electricity. Retailers are here presumed to
re-sell electricity bought to end-users at pre-contracted prices (equal to end-users’ marginal value of electricity).
Alternatively, firms here labelled retailers may be thought of as large end-users that substitute away from
electricity at certain price levels and whose production levels are fixed.
9manipulation of the permit market. No retailer of electricity has incentives to unilaterally
withhold demand units from the market.
Subjects were recruited amongst students in Economics at the intermediary level at
Stockholm University. Each subject participated in one session only. One day in advance of the
session, subjects who were to represent producers (retailers) received instructions common to all
producers (retailers).11 These instructions (available in Appendix B) included information about:
(i) the climate change policy issue and tradable permit systems,
(ii) the market structure, expected production and abatement costs as well as the expected
demand for electricity, and the competitive outcome calculated on basis of this information,
(iii) that the cost/value information could be updated but that only small information
asymmetries were to be expected,
(iv) the trading rules,
(v) the show-up fee, and
(vi) a statement that they could earn considerable amounts of money by trading electricity
and carbon emission permits.
At the outset of the session, before engaging in trade, subjects participated in the training
program included in the Multi-Unit-Double-Auction (MUDA) program package (Plott, 1991).
Thereafter, each subject received private information about which firm he/she would represent,
that firm’s updated production costs/values of electricity (see Table B1 in Appendix B) and
his/her payoff factor.12 No information was given about other firms’ updating. Expected and
actual production costs (values) of electricity were such that the “expectation error” regarding
the competitive price level was close to zero. For individual producers (retailers) the expectation
error ranged from zero to seven (19) percent in price terms.13
Each subject was paid a fraction of the profits he/she was able to negotiate on the behalf of
his/her firm. Since both the market power outcomes and the competitive outcome imply rather
unequal divisions of trade gains, individual pay-off factors were used.14 At the beginning of a
session, each subject was given a fixed payment of SEK 90 (over and above a show up fee of
SEK 100 ≈ US$ 10 at the time the experiment was conducted). Any net-losses at the end of the
session would be deducted from this fixed payment up to a maximum deduction of SEK 90. This
was done in order to give subjects incentives to continue to maximize their firms’ gains also in
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 At this point in time subjects did not know which firm they were to represent. Moreover, during the session they
would be anonymous to each other. Therefore, the risk of collusive behavior was deemed low.
12
 To avoid that firm D (the firm crucial for the test of market power effects) would be represented by subjects
having problems to implement their strategies because of insufficient skills in using MUDA, subjects
representing this firm were randomly selected among those ”producer subjects” that best seemed to assimilate
the MUDA training.
13
 In Brown-Kruse et al. and Godby (forthcoming) very strong information asymmetries were induced. Subjects
representing the dominant firm were informed about all firms’ costs while subjects representing fringe firms only
knew their own costs.
14
 For fringe firms 1–5, the pay off factors were 1.0, 5.0, 5.0, 5.0, and 2.0 SEK/1000 SEK in firm’s profit
respectively. For firm D it was 0.05. For all retailers it amounted to 0.1. These pay off factors are 5–28 (three)
times higher than those used in earlier studies for the fringe firms (firm D).
10
case they would experience large losses in early trading periods. Thus, although subjects could
not loose money by participating in the experiment they could loose money by engaging in trade
transactions. Subjects’ experimental earnings turned out to range from SEK 0 to 1000 (net of the
show-up fee and income taxes).
When producing (selling) electricity producer-subjects had to decide what fuel to use, coal or
biomass, i.e., whether or not they should emit carbon.15 To be in compliance, a subject had to
possess, at the end of the grace period, one emission permit for each electricity unit he/she had
produced using coal. A subject found to be in non-compliance had to pay a penalty fee for each
overshooting emission unit. The penalty fee was set to SEK 250 thousand per emission unit, to
be compared with a competitive (exclusionary manipulation) permit price equal to SEK 105
(185) thousand. (See Table 1, below.)
The electricity market and the permit market opened at the same point in time. The former
held open for ten minutes (the length of the compliance period) and the latter was open during
13 minutes, yielding a grace period of three minutes. When both markets had closed, subjects were
given two minutes to calculate their earnings and prepare for a subsequent trading period. No
changes in the parameter setting were made between trading periods and each subject represented
one and the same firm throughout the session he/she participated in.16 Each session comprised six
trading periods. However, the first period was used solely for training purposes and the outcome
of this period is not reported below. Three sessions were conducted. So, this experiment produced
three independent observations, each consisting of a series of five trading periods.
4.2 Benchmarks
When firms end up in non-compliance or “over-compliance” the measure of efficiency often
used when evaluating laboratory market outcomes—i.e., (Σfirm’s realized profits)/(Σfirm’s profit)
under perfect competition—will, in general, be misleading. The reasons are two. First, the event of
aggregate emissions exceeding (falling below) the target level implies a social cost (revenue—a
negative cost).17 If this were not the case, there would be no need to regulate carbon emissions in
the first place. Second, penalties collected from non-complying firms allow the government to
increase its spending or lower some distortionary tax, of which both options generate a positive
social value. Here, an efficiency index is used that accommodates these consequences. The index
is calculated as (Σfirm’s realized profits)/(Σfirm’s profit under perfect competition) plus (the
social value of additional governmental spending due to Σpenalty minus the social value of
overshooting emission units)/(Σfirm’s profit under perfect competition), where overshooting units
equal actual aggregate emissions minus the target level. The social marginal value of carbon
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 Combustion of both coal and biomass release carbon to the atmosphere. However, the current view is that biomass
during its “growing phase” assimilates carbon to an extent such that the net-effect of biomass combustion is zero
(IPCC, 1996).
16
 In Brown-Kruse et al. and Godby (forthcoming) subjects representing fringe producers switched firms with each
other every fifth/third period without knowing this.
17
 Given the emission levels in other sectors, this cost may reflect a government’s will to comply with an
international climate treaty. In case there exists an international market for carbon emissions quotas to which
only the government has access, the government’s opportunity costs of additional emission quota holdings equal
the international quota unit price.
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Table 1. Benchmark Cases
Prices and Quantities (coal-based production within parenthesis) (SEK thousand, permit units and GWh)
Permit holdings Electricity production Permit Electricity
Fringe D-firm Fringe D-firm Total price price
• PERMIT TRADING
(1) competitive markets 3-4 6-7 5-6 (3-4) 9-10 (6-7) 15 (10) 105-110 120-125
(2) exclusionary manipulation 1 9 4 (1) 8 (8) 12 (9) 180 185
(3) competitive permit market, manipulated power market1
i) 3 7 6 (3) 7 (7) 13 (10) 125-145 165
ii) 3 7 5 (3) 7 (7) 14 (10) 120-125 145
• NO PERMIT TRADING
(4) competitive power market 0 10 3 (0) 10 (10) 13 (10) – 150-165
(5) manipulated power market 0 10 3 (0) 9 (9) 12 (9) – 150-185
Trade Surplus and Efficiency (SEK thousand and percent)
Producers’ (D’s) Retailers’
surplus
Total Social
gains2
Efficiency %3
• PERMIT TRADING
(1) competitive markets 1299 (1220) 2100 3399 3399 100
(2) exclusionary manipulation  1744 (1540) 1320 3064 3169 93
(3) competitive permit market, manipulated power market1
i) 1659 (1485) 1560 3219 3219 95
ii) 1554 (1435) 1820 3374 3374 99
• NO PERMIT TRADING
(4) competitive power market 1449-1644 (1350-1500) 1560-1755 3204 3204 94
(5) manipulated pwr market 1314-1734 (1215-1530) 1320-1740 3054 3159 93
1. Two predictions are possible; see Godby (1997) for details. The outcomes presented under benchmark (3) presume (a)
that the permit price equals the upper bound of the interval stated and (b) that the fringe does not produce and sell a
zero-profit coal-based electricity unit. If not (b), D’s production would be one coal-based unit lower and so would its
permit holding, which yield a profit that is SEK 5 thousand lower.
2. Social gains = Total Surplus + ∑ penalty – 105 x ( ∑emissions – cap).
3. Efficiency of (j) = [ Social gains of (j) / Social gains of (1) ] x 100; j = 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.
emissions is taken to be constant and equal to the fully competitive permit price, and the social
value of increasing governmental spending with one SEK is taken to be constant and equal one
SEK. These values are chosen not because they would be representative for any real economy,
but since they, for the purpose of this study, constitute rather conservative values.18
The outcome is evaluated against a set of benchmarks, namely the cases of (1) competitive
markets, (2) exclusionary manipulation and (3) a competitive permit market and a product
market manipulated by firm D. In these benchmarks, market manipulation is equivalent to
quantity withholding. To indicate the size of the potential gains from trading in these laboratory
markets, two other benchmarks are also presented: (4) no emissions trading and a competitive
product market and (5) no emissions trading and a manipulated product market. In benchmark
cases (2) and (5) firm D holds one permit in excess of the amount required for being in
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 A positive marginal deadweight loss of fiscal taxes would imply a higher social value of revenues from penalties
for non-compliance, and, hence, would tend to increase the efficiency of such outcomes. A higher social value of
emission reductions would tend to increase (decrease) the efficiency of outcomes where actual aggregate
emissions fall short of (exceed) the emission target.
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compliance. This implies that aggregate emissions in these cases fall short of the aggregate
emission target by one unit. All benchmarks are presented in Table 1.19
As shown in Table 1 the outcomes in the benchmark cases are rather close to each other,
especially in terms of production and efficiency. Two notes can be made of this fact. First, despite
the extreme initial allocation of permits the chosen parameter set-up implies rather small potential
gains from emissions trading—compare case (5) with (3) or case (4) with (1). Second, firm D’s
production level does not vary much across the three market power cases—(2), (3i) and (3ii).
Moreover, (3ii) coincides with (1) with respect to permit holdings and D’s and F’s production,
which implies that case (3ii) is rather close to the competitive outcome also in terms of efficiency.
Thus, to discriminate between benchmarks (1) and (3ii) we have to study also the price outcome.
5. RESULTS
The experimental outcome is summarized in terms of prices and quantities in Table 2 below.
As mentioned above, the outcome in each session is an independent observation (consisting of a
series of five trading periods). We may look at these observations in various ways, e.g., giving
the outcome in each period equal weight or focusing only on a subset of the periods within each
session.
The mean of session averages (calculated over all periods), stated in the second last row in
Table 2, reveals that in terms of quantities the outcome on the permit market is within the range
of the competitive outcome—benchmark case (1). So is also the fringe’s electricity production.
Nevertheless, total supply of electricity is substantially below the competitive level. In fact, it lies
between benchmarks (2) and (3i). This is due to the low production by firm D. Moreover, firm D’s
permit holdings and coal use indicate an outcome closer to case (1), (3i) and (3ii) than to case (2).
In terms of closing prices the outcome resembles case (3ii) rather than (2) or (3i). In other words,
the theory of exclusionary manipulation—benchmark (2)—does not do well in structuring data.
Rather, the outcome seems to indicate that the permit market was fairly competitive but that firm
D manipulated the electricity market by reducing the quantities it supplied.
In all sessions, production levels tend to increase and prices tend to decrease over periods
(see Table 2 and Figures 2–4). A possible explanation for this is that subjects were “learning the
game” during initial trading periods and became more sophisticated and informed traders in later
periods. If so, it would be more relevant to focus on the outcome in later periods. The mean of
session averages (calculated over periods 4–5) is presented in the last row in Table 2. As
compared to the mean calculated on all periods, the mean outcome in the last two periods has
moved closer to the case of competitive markets. Still, it is difficult to discriminate between
benchmark cases (1), (3i) and (3ii). While permit holdings and closing prices on both markets are
closer to (1) than to (3i) or (3ii), firm D’s production, total production and mean prices are closer
to (3i) or (3ii) than to (1). Looking at other dimensions of the outcome gives no clear guidance.
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 For derivations of these benchmarks the reader is referred to Godby (1997). The derivations therein do not take
into account the social value of overshooting emission units. Therefore, SEK 105 thousand have been added to
the social gains in benchmarks (2) and (5) in Table 1.
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Table 2. Outcome: Prices and Quantities (coal-based production within parenthesis)
Final permit holdings Electricity production Permit price Electricity price
Fringe D-firm Fringe D-firm Total Mean End Mean End
Session 1
Period 1 6 31 7 (5) 3 (3) 10 (8) 210 150 211 200
Period 2 5 41 5 (3) 8 (4) 13 (7) 208 170 207 150
Period 3 6 4 6 (3) 6 (3) 12 (6) 178 150 194 170
Period 4 4 6 6 (4) 10 (6) 16 (10) 146 100 173 140
Period 5 4 6 6 (3) 9 (5) 15 (8) 125 108 151 120
Average 5 4.61 6 (3.6) 7.2 (4.2) 13.2 (7.8) 173 136 187 156
Session 2
Period 1 2 61 5 (3) 6 (5) 11 (8) 188 152 185 186
Period 2 1 81 6 (3) 7 (7) 13 (10) 82 10 179 199
Period 3 1 9 4 (3) 10 (9) 14 (12) 135 135 166 161
Period 4 3 7 6 (5) 7 (7) 13 (12) 92 60 161 145
Period 5 4 6 7 (6) 8 (7) 15 (13) 92 100 150 100
Average 2.2 7.21 5.6 (4) 7.6 (7) 13.2 (11) 118 91 168 158
Session 3
Period 1 1 61 5 (1) 3 (3) 8 (4) 171 130 177 150
Period 2 1 81 5 (1) 6 (6) 11 (7) 140 120 144 150
Period 3 2 71 6 (2) 7 (7) 13 (9) 137 130 138 145
Period 4 4 6 7 (5) 6 (6) 13 (11) 142 130 141 140
Period 5 3 7 5 (3) 7 (7) 12 (10) 130 100 144 135
Average 2.2 6.81 5.6 (2.4) 5.8 (5.8) 11.4 (8.2) 144 122 149 144
Mean of session averages
  Periods 1-5 3.1 6.21 5.7 (3.3) 6.9 (5.7) 12.6 (9) 145 116 168 153
  Periods 4-5 3.7 6.3 6.2 (4.3) 7.8 (6.3) 14 (10.7) 121 100 153 130
1. Permit(s) held by retailer(s).
To sum up: The outcome seems to reject the case of exclusionary manipulation but it is not clear
what benchmark is in favor, (i) fully competitive markets, or (ii) a competitive permit market and
a manipulated electricity market.
Given that in later periods closing prices and trade volumes on both markets are quite close to
competitive levels, the interpretation is that trade would be highly efficient. Table 3 indicates that
this indeed is the case. Session averages for the last two trading periods in Session 1, 2 and 3 equal
99%, 94.5% and 93.5%, respectively—all above the rates in benchmark case (5). So, allowing firms
to engage in emissions trading seems to increase efficiency. However, although the mean rate
(96%) is higher than in benchmarks (2) and (3i) it is substantially below the ones in (3ii) and (1).
Individual firms were in non-compliance in eight of the fifteen periods (cf. Table A1 in
Appendix A). However, in several of these periods firm D or fringe firms held more permits than
their emission levels required, and in some periods also retailers of electricity held permits at the
end of the grace period. Therefore, aggregate emissions exceeded the target level of ten emission
units only in four periods. In eight periods aggregate emissions fell below the target level. The
efficiency implications of this are shown in the second and third columns in Table 3.
Compared to the case of perfectly competitive markets the dominant producer (firm D) gained
more while fringe firms as well as electricity retailers gained less, especially in early periods (cf.
Table 3 and Table A2 in Appendix A). In fact, the fringe firms’ aggregate profits (= Producers’
surplus minus firm D’s surplus in Table 3) were negative in most periods, something that may
have contributed to reduce the efficiency. A similar outcome was observed in Brown-Kruse et al.
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Figure 2. (a) Electricity Market Periods 0–5, (b) Permit Market Periods 0–5;
Session 1 (first period for training purpose)20
and Godby (forthcoming), respectively. Thus, the hypothesis that the outcome of negative profits
in earlier tests was due to the fact that firms/subjects there had to decide upon their permit
holdings before knowing the product price seems to be rejected. Another, still living, hypothesis
may be that some feature of the common parameter set up used in these experiments drives the
finding of low fringe earnings. For instance, the costs and valuations are such that, for a wide
range of price levels, several fringe producers had no opportunities to engage in profitable (net)
trade. Lack of opportunities to undertake reasonable activities (profitable trades) in laboratory
market experiments has been shown to provoke “irrational” behavior, see Lei et al. (2001).
5.1 Comparison with Outcomes in Earlier Studies
The outcome of the experiment presented here differs from the outcome observed in earlier
exclusionary-manipulation experiments in several ways. For instance, here, total production
seems to be higher while prices seem to be lower. As has been emphasized above, the design of
the experiment presented here differs in several potentially important aspects from the design of
earlier tests of exclusionary manipulation, whereby we cannot without further experiments
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 The figures show asks, bids and transactions made on the market indicated. The vertical bars indicate the end of
each trading period. (On the electricity market diagrams there are two vertical bars for each trading period, the
first indicates the closure of the electricity market and the second the closure of the permit market.) The first
period in the diagrams is the training period in which subjects did not face pecuniary incentives. The reader
should not pay attention to the outcome in this period.
(b)(a)
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Figure 3. (ai) Electricity Market Periods 0–1, (bi) Permit Market Periods 0–1; Session 2 (first period for
training purpose). (aii) Electricity Market Periods 2–5, (bii) Permit Market Periods 2–5; Session 2.21
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 Due to network problems in Session 2, the MUDA program had to be restarted between periods 1 and 2. This
explains why there are two figures for each market in Session 2.
(bi)(ai)
(bii)(aii)
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Figure 4. (a) Electricity Market Periods 0–5, (b) Permit Market Periods 0–5;
Session 3 (first period for training purpose).
Table 3. Outcome: Trade Surplus and Efficiency (SEK thousand and percent)
Sum
penalty
Social value
of over-
shooting em’s
Producers’ (D’s) Retailers’ Total
Surplus
Social
gains
Efficiency
%
Session 1
Period 1 0 –210 2251 (2245) 758 3009 3219 95
Period 2 0 –315 2189 (2400) 735 2924 3239 95
Period 3 0 –420 1674 (1870) 1215 2889 3309 97
Period 4 250 0 1859 (1965) 1265 3124 3374 99
Period 5 0 –210 1437 (1500) 1707 3144 3354 99
Average 50 –231 1938 (2052) 1136 3074 3299 97
Session 2
Period 1 250 210 1743 (1740) 916 2659 3119 92
Period 2 500 0 1148 (1170) 1371 2519 3019 89
Period 3 500 210 1440 (1579) 1525 2965 3255 96
Period 4 500 210 1267 (1273) 1612 2879 3169 93
Period 5 750 315 1126 (1123) 1703 2829 3264 96
Average 500 105 1345 (1377) 1425 2770 3165 93
Session 3
Period 1 0 –630 1278 (1124) 516 1794 2424 71
Period 2 0 –315 937 (1005) 1637 2574 2889 85
Period 3 0 –105 1111 (1232) 1783 2894 2999 88
Period 4 250 105 1207 (1275) 1872 3079 3224 95
Period 5 0 0 1319 (1250) 1815 3134 3134 92
Average 50 –189 1172 (1177) 1525 2697 2934 86
Mean of session averages
Periods 1-5 200 –105 1485 (1535) 1362 2847 3133 92
Periods 4-5 292 210 1369 (1398) 1662 3032 3253 96
(b)(a)
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isolate the effect(s) any individual design change has had on the outcome. Still, since these
changes were made to create an experimental situation that more closely than earlier tests
parallels important features of carbon permit trade amongst electricity producers or to arrive at
an experimental situation that subjects easily could understand and relate to, it is clearly of
interest whether or not observed differences are statistically significant. Here, the mean of the
(three independent) session averages produced by each one of Brown-Kruse et al., Godby
(forthcoming) and this study is compared by means of the Permutation test, see Siegel and
Castellan (1988). The results of all tests made and the outcomes in the earlier tests are
summarized in Appendix C.
A comparison based on the outcome in the last five periods tells us that (a) average and
closing permit prices, (b) the closing electricity price, and (c) the dominant firm’s hoarding of
permits, observed here are statistically lower (at the 5 or the 10 percent level) than the levels
observed in Brown-Kruse et al. Given this, it is surprisingly that differences in permit holdings
and production volume are not statistically secured.
However, this comparison, based on the outcome in all periods in this experiment and the
outcome in the last five periods in earlier tests in which each session consisted of at least 10
periods, may lead to biased conclusions since subjects in these earlier studies then have had
(five) more periods to learn from and adjust there behavior in. Therefore, also the outcome in the
last two periods in each study was subjected to a significance test. Now, several additional
differences are deemed significant. Among these are that closing prices on the electricity market
observed here is lower than the (uniform) price level observed in Brown-Kruse et al. and Godby
(forthcoming). Moreover, total electricity production and efficiency are higher than the levels
observed in the studies just mentioned.
So, barring the possibility that observed differences are due to the use of different subject
pools, the conclusion is that the changes made in the experimental design have produced an
outcome (in later trading periods) that is closer to the efficient one. In other words, the outcome
of exclusionary manipulation and low efficiency observed in earlier tests is not robust to the
changes made in the experimental design (a) that increase the parallelism between the laboratory
and the field or (b) that aim at facilitating subjects understanding of the decision problem.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The case of exclusionary manipulation of permit markets has here been tested in an experiment
designed to parallel some important institutional and information conditions of real carbon permit
markets, in particular those of carbon permit systems for electricity producers. Thus, firms
(subjects) could here trade permits during not only the compliance period but also during a so-
called grace period. Both permits and electricity were traded on so-called double-auction markets.
The outcome seems to reject the case of exclusionary manipulation. But, even if the outcome on
the permit market is close to the efficient outcome, the dominant firm withheld supply from the
electricity market. So, although both markets were governed by double auction rules, a market
power outcome seems to have emerged on the electricity market. The reasons for this asymmetry
cannot be determined without further tests. However, given the parameter set-up used, the market
power outcome obtained is close to the efficient (competitive) outcome. In later trading periods,
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permit holdings, closing prices on the permit and the electricity markets as well as total electricity
production are close to the efficient levels. Consequently, high efficiency is observed.
These results stand in contrast to the findings of earlier tests and indicate that the outcomes of
low efficiency observed in earlier tests are not robust to the changes made here in the design to
increase the parallelism between the laboratory and the field or improve subjects understanding
of the decision problem. Similarities were also found. For instance, subjects representing small
producers often experienced negative gains (implying low subject’s earnings), something that
may have lead to a reduction in efficiency. A potential cause for this outcome lies in the
parameter set up used (here and in earlier tests), which is such that for a wide range of prices
several of the small producers have no opportunities to engage in profitable net-trade on any of
the markets. Such lack of meaningful tasks may have provoked some subjects to make excessive
speculations or simply to trade anyway. This calls for future tests with experimental designs that
allow all subjects to have active roles as net-traders.
Although attempts were made to construct laboratory markets that quite closely parallel the
likely case of real carbon permit trade among electricity producers, some overly simplified
assumptions have been made. For instance, firms were not allowed to bank or borrow carbon
permits to/from the next compliance period. This is another important route for future research
to go.
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APPENDIX A. EXPERIMENTAL OUTCOME
Table A1. Production and Producers’ Permit Holdings (the training period not included)
Session 1 Session 2 Session 3
            Period                    Period                    Period        Benchmark
Firm # 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 (1) (2)
F1
 Coal 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bio 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Permits 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Penalties 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F2
 Coal 2 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bio 0 0 1 0 2 1 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Permits 2 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Penalties 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F3
 Coal 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 2 0 0
Bio 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 0 0 0 0
Permits 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 2 0 0
Penalties 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F4
 Coal 1 0 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 1 1 0 1-2 0
Bio 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Permits 2 2 4 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1-2 0
Penalties 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F5
 Coal 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 2 1 2 1
Bio 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Permits 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 1 1 2 1
Penalties 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
D
 Coal 3 4 3 6 5 5 7 9 7 7 3 6 7 6 7 6-7 8
Bio 0 4 3 4 4 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3-4 0
Permits 3 4 4 6 6 6 8 9 7 6 6 8 7 6 7 6-7 9
Penalties 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sum
 Coal 8 7 6 10 8 8 10 12 12 13 4 7 9 11 10 10 9
Bio 2 6 6 6 7 3 3 2 1 2 4 4 4 2 2 5-6 3
Total prod. 10 13 12 16 15 11 13 14 13 15 8 11 13 13 12 15 12
Permits held
by producers 9 9 10 10 10 8 9 10 10 10 7 9 9 10 10 10 10
Penalties 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 2 2 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
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Table A2. Producers’ and Retailers’ Profits, SEK 1000 (the training period not included)
Firm #                     Trading Period                           Benchmark 
1 2 3 4 5 (1)* (2)
Session 1
F1 359 289 119 149 54 49 169
F2 -35 -125 140 105 -25 0 35
F3 21 0 0 -160 0 0 0
F4 -305 -325 -490 -100 -130 5 0
F5 -34 -50 35 -100 38 25 0
D 2245 2400 1870 1965 1500 1220 1540
R1 245 330 210 105 395 540 360
R2 210 130 195 305 355 520 340
R3 -20 195 365 390 467 520 320
R4 323 80 445 465 490 520 300
ΣFi 6 -211 -196 -106 -63 79 204
ΣRj 758 735 1215 1265 1707 2100 1320
Total (=ΣFi + ΣRj + D) 3009 2924 2889 3124 3144 3399 3064
Session 2
F1 38 137 0 144 99 49 169
F2 40 29 10 56 48 0 35
F3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F4 -75 -188 -184 -210 -224 5 0
F5 0 0 35 0 80 25 0
D 1740 1170 1579 1273 1123 1220 1540
R1 360 356 392 415 452 540 360
R2 350 345 430 430 440 520 340
R3 126 345 371 387 415 520 320
R4 80 325 332 380 396 520 300
ΣFi 3 -22 -139 -6 3 79 204
ΣRj 916 1371 1525 1612 1703 2100 1320
Total (=ΣFi + ΣRj + D) 2659 2519 2965 2879 2829 3399 3064
Session 3
F1 194 84 60 84 87 49 169
F2 100 0 0 0 0 0 35
F3 -140 -176 -194 -41 -48 0 0
F4 0 0 3 4 0 5 0
F5 0 24 10 -115 30 25 0
D 1124 1005 1232 1275 1250 1220 1540
R1 350 495 525 500 495 540 360
R2 -19 441 458 466 467 520 340
R3 295 460 350 465 400 520 320
R4 -110 241 450 441 453 520 300
ΣFi 154 -68 -121 -68 69 79 204
ΣRj 516 1637 1783 1872 1815 2100 1320
Total (=ΣFi + ΣRj + D) 1794 2574 2894 3079 3134 3399 3064
* These calculations assume (a) that the competitive product (permit) price equals the upper (lower) boundary of
the interval possible equilibrium prices, 120-125 (105-110).
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APPENDIX B. Induced Costs/Valuations and Instructions
BI. Costs/Valuation
Table B1. Production Costs and Retailers’ Valuation (expected values within parenthesis)*
Firm Unit Production cost       Extra cost of Bio Firm Unit Contract Price
Coal Bio  (Bio – Coal) (Marginal Valuation)
F1 1 45 (43) 81 (77) 36 (34) R1 1 405 (482)
2 45 (43) 120 (114) 75 (71) 2 265 (315)
F2 1 35 (33) 150 (142) 115 (109) 3 245 (292)
2 40 (38) 195 (185) 155 (147) 4 105 (125)
F3 1 25 (24) 220 (210) 195 (186) 5 85 (101)
2 30 (29) 265 (252) 235 (223) R2 1 385 (458)
F4 1 15 (14) 290 (275) 275 (261) 2 285 (339)
2 20 (19) 335 (318) 315 (299) 3 225 (268)
F5 1 5   (5) 360 (342) 355 (337) 4 125 (149)
2 10 (10) 405 (385) 395 (375) 5 65 (77)
D 1 15 (14) 60 (57) 45 (43) R3 1 365 (434)
2 15 (14) 80 (76) 65 (62) 2 305 (363)
3 15 (14) 100 (95) 85 (81) 3 205 (244)
4 15 (14) 120 (114) 105 (100) 4 145 (173)
5 15 (14) 140 (133) 125 (119) 5 45 (54)
6 15 (14) 160 (152) 145 (138) R4 1 345 (411)
7 15 (14) 180 (171) 165 (157) 2 325 (387)
8 15 (14) 200 (190) 185 (176) 3 185 (220)
9 15 (14) 220 (209) 205 (195) 4 165 (196)
10 15 (14) 240 (240) 225 (214) 5 25 (30)
* Actual values correspond to those used in Godby (forthcoming).
BII. Instructions
Subjects received written information on two occasions. One day before the experiment,
subjects that would represent electricity producers (retailers) were given instructions common for
all producer (retailer) subjects. At the beginning of the experiment, each subject received private
information about which firm he/she was assigned to, that firm’s actual costs (values) and his/her
payoff factor. Below are reproduced the information common to all producer-subjects, and for
illustration, the private information given to the subject representing the dominant firm, referred
to as Firm 6 in these instructions. Text in bold within brackets are explanatory notes to the reader
of the paper.
Common instructions to electricity producers [translated from Swedish]:
You will participate in an experiment about climate change policy. More precisely, the
experiment aims at shedding some light on the possibilities to reduce a country’s costs
of reducing the emissions of so-called greenhouse gases, by the means of tradable
emission permits. During the experiment, you will act as a decision-maker on markets
for emission permits and electricity and have the opportunity to earn money. Read the
following text carefully. You earnings will depend on the decisions you make during
the experiment.
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B1. Background
Greenhouse gases allow solar radiation to be transmitted inward but restrict heat radiation from
being transmitted outward from the earth. Carbon dioxide (CO2)—the single most important
greenhouse gas—is added to the atmosphere mainly through combustion of fossil fuels. Current
global emission levels run the risk of leading to a rapid and substantial growth in the average
global temperature. Such a climate change may give rise to changes in wind and sea currents,
higher sea level and desertifications. The conditions for localization of settlements, farming and
industries would thereby be affected, resulting in possible large population movements.
The international community has taken this threat seriously. In December 1997,
representatives of the world’s countries gathered in Kyoto, Japan, to negotiate about a reduction
of the emissions of greenhouse gases. This meeting resulted in a proposal to a climate treaty
comprising a set of quantitative emission targets for the industrialized countries, the so-called
Kyoto Protocol. In November 2000 the countries gathered again in Haag, the Netherlands, to
specify parts of the Protocol. These negotiations did not solve all problems and it is for the
moment unclear whether the Protocol will be ratified by a sufficient number of countries to enter
into force. However, although no binding international climate treaty yet exists, a number of
countries have established unilateral targets for their emissions of CO2.
Several countries have already decided to implement tradable permit systems (TP) to reduce
their emissions of CO2 or consider doing so, among them Denmark and Sweden. The European
Union discusses the introduction of international trade with CO2 emissions. At the national level,
TP systems work in the following way. First, the government sets a limit for the aggregate
emissions a group of firms are allowed to make. Then, the government allocates tradable
emission permits to the firms, according to some formula. Different firms may be allocated
different number of permits. Since the permits are transferable, the firms can trade permits with
each other. Firms with high costs to reduce their emissions can buy permits from firms with
lower cost. On a competitive permit market an equilibrium price will be established so that the
firms’ marginal abatement costs are equalized, i.e., the cost-effective allocation of abatements is
reached.
Here, we will focus on CO2 emissions from fossil fuel based electricity production. For
simplicity, it is assumed that all electricity production is of this type, a condition that more or
less reflects the situation in Denmark.
The objective of the experiment is to investigate how trade with CO2 permits amongst firms
on the electricity market evolves when it is conducted on an exchange.
B2. The Experiment
On the electricity market simulated in the experiment there are six producers/seller and four
retailers/buyers of electricity. You will play the role of a producer. On x-day you will be
informed about which one of these six producers you will represent. Your payment consists of a
fixed participation fee that amounts to SEK 100 and an incentive payment, the size of which
depends on the profits you are able to negotiate on the behalf on your company. The size of the
incentive payment cannot be stated in advance, but it is expected to amount to SEK 200-300 per
person.
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B2.1 Market structure and expected costs
The electricity producers differ from each other in terms of i.a. production capacity and costs.
Five firms have a production capacity of 2 electricity units while one firm can produce up to 10
units. (With an electricity-unit is meant 10 GWh, a common trade unit on electricity markets.)
All six producers use fossil fuels (coal) to produce electricity, which give rise to CO2 emissions.
For the time being there exists no economically justified technology to separate and deposit
carbon. Thus, to reduce the emissions of CO2 the use of fossil fuels has to be reduced. By using
biomass a firm can produce electricity without generating CO2-emissions.22 However, it is more
costly to produce electricity with biomass than with coal. The size of this extra cost varies
typically among producers (see below). (The extra cost depends largely on what type of
production facilities the firms have but also on the localization and age of the facilities.)
One (1) kton CO2 is the amount emitted when an electricity unit is generated using coal. The
government is assumed to have decided that the six producers’ aggregate CO2 emissions is not
allowed to exceed 10 kton per year and has chosen to distribute emission permits to these firms,
according to some formula. A permit allows the holder to emit 1 kton CO2 during the period (one
year) the permit is valid. Tradable permit systems requires that firms’ CO2 emissions can be
monitored, e.g., by keeping track of their use of coal (purchase plus changes in inventory).
The government distributes 10 permits each year. Since these permits are transferable the
firms can trade permits with each other. Thus, a firm can sell permits (if it received any in the
initial allocation), buy, re-sell or re-buy permits. No firm is allowed to emit more than its permit
holding (ex post trade) allows.
A firm that during a year has used coal to produce electricity must, at the end of that year,
possess at least one permit for each electricity unit generated in that way. A firm’s valuation of
using a permit in the production equals the cost saving the firm is doing by using coal instead of
biomass, to be compared with the alternative cost of the permit.
Firms that during a year emit more CO2 than they hold permits for have to pay a penalty.
Penalty = SEK 250000 per overshooting kton CO2
Electricity producers have good knowledge about each other’s production technologies. In the
field, it can therefore be assumed that they have quite accurate information about each other’s
costs of producing electricity with different fuels, albeit not perfect information. Estimates of the
six firm marginal costs are shown in Table 1. [The content of Table 1 is stated within
parenthesis in columns 3-5 in Table B1 above.]
On the electricity market there are four retailers who buy electricity from producers and resell
it to households and firms. Here, the producers are assumed to be able to estimate the retailers’
demand for electricity with quite good precision. The retailers’ expected demand is presented in
Table 2. [The content of Table 2 is stated in the last column in Table B1 above.]
                                                 
22
 Also combustion of biomass releases CO2. But since CO2 of the same amount are bounded in the trees when these
are growing, the combustion of biomass is taken to not add to the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere. For
simplicity, we say here that combustion of biomass does not generate any CO2 emissions. We also abstract from
the opportunity to reduce emissions by increasing the energy effectiveness (produced GWh electricity/GWh
fuel). The reason being that for a given set of production units this potential is small.
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Whoever wants to may trade emission permits, so also retailers of electricity, which thus can
speculate in permits.
Given the total number of permits (10), the cost and demand data in Table 1 and Table 2 and
given an assumption that the markets for electricity and permits are competitive, expected market
supply of and demand for electricity would be as indicated by Figure A1. The figure shows that
under these assumptions the expected electricity price would amount to approximately SEK 125
thousand. Similarly, it can be shown that the expected permit price on a perfectly competitive
market would amount to approximately SEK 105 thousand. The volume of the permit trade and
the distribution of trade surpluses depend on how the government distributes the permits initially
amongst the electricity producers. When the experiment begins you will be informed about this
initial allocation.
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Figure A1. Supply of and Demand for electricity, given a competitive permit market
Observe! Even if, as we have said here, electricity producers have strong incentives to gather
information about each others’ production costs and the market demand for electricity, it has to
be emphasized that no one can be 100 % certain that available information is correct or if it will
guide market behavior. Although this uncertainty can be assumed to be small, given the
incentives for information gathering, it may affect the conditions for trade. This uncertainty
implies that the true production costs and demand for electricity may deviate from the data you
have been given in Table 1, Table 2 and Figure A1. Before the trade begins you will receive
private information about your firm’s actual production costs.
B2.2 Market organization
Thus, as an electricity producer you trade on two markets. On the permit market you act as a
trader, i.e., you can both buy and sell permits. Also retailers of electricity may act as traders on
the permit market. On the electricity market you can only sell electricity units and retailers can
only buy electricity units. The permit market is open during the whole period the permits are
valid (one year) plus some period thereafter. Thus, it is possible that a producer may purchase a
sufficient number of permits before it produces electricity (and possibly causes CO2 emissions)
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or chose to first produce electricity and thereafter—if need arise—via trade make sure that it
holds a sufficient large number of permits.
Purchase and sales of permits and electricity
Trade with permits as well as trade with electricity is conducted on electronic exchanges.
Purchase and sales of permits concern one permit at the time.
(1) You may submit one (or several) bid or ask on the market or remain passive in this regard.
(2) You may buy a permit either by accepting the standing ask (the lowest price anyone has
announced willingness to sell to) or—if you have submitted a bid with the highest price
anyone has announced willingness to buy to—if someone accepts your bid. The number
of permits you can buy is limited only by your firm’s budget. Thus, you may not buy
permits on credit.
(3) You may sell a permit either if a buyer accepts your ask or by you accepting the standing
bid on the market. You cannot sell more permits than your firm holds in its inventory.
Also on the electricity market one unit is traded at the time. You may sell electricity in two
ways: (1) by accepting the standing bid or (2) if someone accepts the standing ask of yours. You
can only sell electricity units that your firm has produced.
 
Bookkeeping of permit and electricity transactions
During the experiment you have to record all your transactions on a bookkeeping form.
Attached you find such a bookkeeping form. Below are presented examples that illustrate how
you should record your transactions.
Each time you buy a permit you shall record the price on the bookkeeping form. Ex.: If you
buy your first permit for SEK x thousand, you shall write x on the first row in the Buy price
column under Trade with permits. If you in your second transaction buy an additional permit for
SEK y thousand you shall note that price on the second row in the Buying price column. When
the market has closed you sum your expenditures on permits and write the obtained sum (x+y) on
the row Total Permits in the Buy price column.
Each time you sell a permit you shall record the price on the bookkeeping form. Ex.: If you in
your third transaction sell a permit to the price SEK a thousand, you shall write a on the third
row in the Sale price column under Trade with permits. If you sell a second permit for SEK b
thousand you shall write b on the fourth row in the Sale price column. Note that even if these
transactions were your first and second sales of permits, they were your third and fourth
transactions and shall therefore be recorded at row three and four, respectively. When the market
has closed, you sum your revenues from permit sales and write the amount obtained on the row
Total in the Sale price column. The large number of rows is to allow you to easy record any re-
buy and re-sell permits.
Also the sales of electricity you make you have to record on the book keeping form. You also
have to note your fuel choice. Ex.: If you first produce and sell one unit electricity, produced
using biomass, for SEK m thousand you shall write this price on the first row in the price column
below Sales of electricity and ”bio” in the Fuel choice column. If you produce a second unit with
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coal and sell this unit for SEK n thousand, you should write n on the second row in the price
column and ”coal” in the Fuel choice column. When the market has closed you shall sum your
revenues and write the figure obtained on the row marked Total.
Firm 2’s expected costs of producing electricity are shown in Table 1. For Firm 2 the
production costs in the last mentioned example would be SEK 142 thousand for the first
electricity unit produced using biomass and SEK 38 thousand for the second unit which was
generated using coal. Thus, total production cost amounts to SEK 180 thousand. Possible costs
for purchase of permits would be added.
 
Calculation of the firm’s profits
If Firm 2 would behave as in the examples given above, it profits would be calculated as
follows:
 
Revenues from electricity sales +m+n
Cost of electricity production -180
Cost of purchase of permits -(x+y)
Revenues from permit sales +a+b
= Profits SEK thousand
 
On x-day at the outset of the experiment you will be informed about which of the six
producers you will represent, the initial allocation of permits and how large share of your firm’s
profits that is yours to keep.
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Bookkeeping form for electricity producers
Name: Period:
Firm number. Date:
Trade with permits                               Sales of electricity                 
Transaction Sale price Buy price Unit Sale price Fuel choice
1 _______ _______ 1 _______ _______
2 _______ _______ 2 _______ _______
3 _______ _______ 3 _______ _______
4 _______ _______ 4 _______ _______
5 _______ _______ 5 _______ _______
6 _______ _______ 6 _______ _______
7 _______ _______ 7 _______ _______
8 _______ _______ 8 _______ _______
9 _______ _______ 9 _______ _______
10 _______ _______ 10 _______ _______
11 _______ _______
12 _______ _______ Total _______
13 _______ _______
14 _______ _______
15 _______ _______
If you need more space continue on the backside.
Total Permits _______ _______
Calculation of your firm’s period profits
Revenues
from
electricity
sales
– Costs of
electricity
production
– Costs for
purchase
of permits
+ Revenues
from sales
of permits
– Penalties
(SEK 250
thousand
per kton)
= Profits
– – + – =
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Private information to firm #6
You represent firm #6. Your assignment is to maximize this firm’s—and thereby your own—
gain. Your firm may produce up to10 electricity units. Your firm’s initial production capacity,
initial inventory, on market 2 (the electricity market) is thus equal to 10. Your firm’s actual
marginal costs are presented in Table 3. [The content of Table 3 equals the parts of Table B1
that are valid for Firm D and not within parenthesis.] You have already received information
about expected marginal costs of other producers and the expected demand for electricity
(Table 1, Table 2 and Figure A1). This information is also enclosed here. [Tables 1 and 2,
corresponds to the figures within parenthesis in Table B1.]
The government has decided to give all 10 emission permits to your firm (Firm #6.) Your
initial inventory on market 1 (the permit market) is therefore equal to 10. This unequal allocation
of permits is explained by the fact that Firm #6 earlier where the single producer on the market
and that the government has chose to allocate permits according to historical emission levels.
Your firm disposes an amount (= your firm’s cash on hand) that initially equals SEK 500
thousand. You may use the money to buy permits of other firms. You are not allowed to buy
permits on credit. Your expenditures on permits can thus not exceed the amount of money that
you dispose. If you sell an electricity unit or a permit your cash on hand will increase by the sales
price. Your cash on hand will automatically be updated every time you engage in transactions on
the markets for electricity and permits.
You cannot sell more electricity units than your firm can produce. Moreover, you may not sell
more permits than your firm holds (= your firms inventory on market 1 which is automatically
updated when you trade permits).
Your payment consists of a fixed part (SEK 100 which will be given to you after the
experiment) and an incentive payment. The incentive payment is calculated according to the
following formula: SEK 90 plus 0.05 × the sum of the gains/losses (in SEK 1000) you have
negotiated for your company in each trading period. For each SEK 1000 in aggregate profit you
have negotiated for your firm your incentive payment increases with SEK 0.05. If you would
negotiate an aggregate loss for your firm your payment decreases with SEK 0.05 for every SEK
1000 in loss. Your incentive payment cannot be smaller than SEK 0.
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APPENDIX C. Summary of Earlier Experiments and Significance Tests
Table C1. Outcome in Earlier Experiments: Session Averages                                                                       
Prices and Quantities (coal based production within parenthesis)
Permit holdings                 Production                 Permit price Product price
Fringe D-firm Fringe D-firm Total (Em’s) Mean End Uniform price
Last five periods
   Brown-Kruse et al.
Session 1 3.4 6.6 6.8 5.2 12 (8.6) 157 154 185
Session 2 1.6 8.4 6 6 12 (7.6) 243 236 185
Session 3 1.6 8.4 5.4 7.6 13 (9.2) 216 216 165
Mean 2.2 7.8 6.1 6.3 12.3 (8.5) 205 202 178
  Godby (forthcoming)
Session 1 4.8 5.2 5.4 6 11.4 (9.6) 108 105 201
Session 2 2.4 7.6 6.2 4.6 10.8 (7) 280 241 209
Session 3 4.2 5.8 5.4 8.2 13.6 (10) 118 121 153
Mean 3.8 6.2 5.7 6.3 11.9 (8.9) 169 156 188
Last two periods 
   Brown-Kruse et al.
Session 1 3 7 6.5 5.5 12 (8.5) 152 150 185
Session 2 1 9 5.5 6.5 12 (7.5) 245 245 185
Session 3 1 9 4.5 8 12.5 (9) 184 184 175
Mean 1.7 8.3 5.5 6.7 12.2 (8.3) 194 193 182
   Godby (forthcoming)
Session 1 5.5 4.5 6 6 12 (10) 102 102 185
Session 2 2.5 7.5 6 4.5 10.5 (7) 286 234 215
Session 3 4 6 5 9 14 (10) 118 118 145
Mean 4 6 5.7 6.5 12.2 (9) 169 151 182
Trade Surplus and Efficiency in the Last five periods (efficiency, not adjusted for emissions off target, within
parenthesis)
Social value of “overshooting” Total Surplus2 Social gains3 Efficiency, %
emission units1
Brown-Kruse et al.   
Session 1 147 2967 3114 91.6 (87.3)
Session 2 252 2692 2944 86.6 (79.2)
Session 3 84 3025 3109 91.5 (89)
Mean 161 2895 3056 90 (85)
Godby (forthcoming)
Session 1 42 3029 3071 90.4 (89.1)
Session 2 315 2634 2949 86.8 (77.5)
Session 3 0 3151 3151 92.7 (92.7)
Mean 119 2938 3057 90 (86)
Source: Godby (1997): Final permit holdings, Figure 6 in Ch. 4 and Figure 6 in Ch. 5; Production, Figure 7 in Ch. 4 and Figure 7
in Ch. 5; Permit prices, Tables 5 and 10 in Appendix B; Product price, Figure 8 in Ch. 4 and Figure 8 in Ch.5.
1. That is: –105 x (actual emissions – 10).
2. Obtained by multiplying Total surplus in Benchmark case (1) with (unadjusted) efficiency rates given in Figure 10 in
Ch. 4 and Figure 10 in Ch. 5 in Godby (1997).
3. Social gains = Total Surplus – 105 x (actual emissions –10).
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Table C2. Permutation Tests of Differences in Mean Outcome
Explanatory notes: A ~ indicates that the null hypothesis of µx = µy cannot be rejected and
a > (<) that the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis µx > µy
(µx < µy). BKEG indicates Brown-Kruse, Elliott and Godby (1995), Godby stands for Godby
(forthcoming), and Carlén indicates this study. If not otherwise stated the 10%-level is
used. A * indicates significance at the 5%-level.
Last five periods
Permit price
Mean BKEG ~ Godby BKEG > Carlén Godby ~ Carlén
Marginal BKEG ~ Godby BKEG > Carlén* Godby ~ Carlén
Electricity price
Mean BKEG ~ Godby BKEG ~ Carlén Godby ~ Carlén
Marginal BKEG ~ Godby BKEG > Carlén* Godby ~ Carlén
Permit holding by
the dominant firm BKEG > Godby BKEG ~ Carlén* Godby ~ Carlén
Hoarding of permits by
the dominant firm 
by frequency BKEG > Godby BKEG > Carlén* Godby ~ Carlén
by # of permits BKEG ~ Godby BKEG > Carlén Godby ~ Carlén
Production levels
the dominant firm BKEG ~ Godby BKEG ~ Carlén Godby ~ Carlén
fringe firms BKEG ~ Godby BKEG ~ Carlén Godby ~ Carlén
Total BKEG ~ Godby BKEG ~ Carlén Godby ~ Carlén
Efficiency BKEG ~ Godby BKEG ~ Carlén Godby ~ Carlén
Last Two Periods
Permit price
Mean BKEG ~ Godby BKEG > Carlén* Godby ~ Carlén
Marginal BKEG ~ Godby BKEG > Carlén* Godby ~ Carlén
Electricity price
Mean BKEG ~ Godby BKEG > Carlén* Godby ~ Carlén
Marginal BKEG ~ Godby BKEG > Carlén* Godby > Carlén*
Permit holding by
the dominant firm BKEG > Godby BKEG > Carlén* Godby ~ Carlén
Hoarding of permits by
the dominant firm 
by frequency BKEG > Godby* BKEG > Carlén* Godby ~ Carlén
by # of permits BKEG ~ Godby BKEG > Carlén* Godby ~ Carlén
Production levels
the dominant firm BKEG ~ Godby BKEG ~ Carlén Godby ~ Carlén
fringe firms BKEG ~ Godby BKEG ~ Carlén Godby < Carlén*
Total BKEG ~ Godby BKEG < Carlén* Godby < Carlén
Efficiency1 BKEG ~ Godby BKEG < Carlén* Godby < Carlén*
1. In Godby (1997), from which data is collected, mean efficiency for BKEG and Godby is only reported
for the last five periods. Therefore, we here use these means adjusted for the value of overshooting
emission units.
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